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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. MILLETT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH--BOARD OF REVIEW, 
No. 16385 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to review a final order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah--Board of Review, denying plaintiff benefits 
for a period of fifty-two weeks under U.C.A. 35-4-5(e) and 
35-4-6(d) and assessing the plaintiff with the liability to 
repay $1,785.00 received by plaintiff during such period of 
disqualification, and declaring him ineligible to receive 
future benefits until full payment is made by plaintiff to The 
Department of Emplovment Security. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The plaintiff initiated his claim for unemployment compensa-
tion effective January 22, 1978 and was determined eligible to 
receive $119.00 a week for 30 weeks. On November 1, 1978, a 
-1-
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letter was sent to the plaintiff by The Industrial Commission 
asking him to explain a discrepancy in his claim filings. The 
plaintiff requested a telephone hearing be scheduled so he 
could make his explanations. 
On November 14, 1978, a telephone hearing was conducted, 
and the conclusion of The Department of Employment Security 
representative was that the plaintiff knowingly withheld in-
formation from the Department to receive benefits. The plain-
tiff then requested that his case be heard by an Appeals 
Referee and on November 30, 1978, filed an appeal. 
The Appeals Referee heard the case on December 19, 1978, 
and affirmed the prior decision. Plaintiff then appealed to 
the Board of Review wherein the prior decisions were affirmed 
in an opinion rendered on the 8th day of March, 1979. This 
appeal is taken from that final decision of The Board of 
Review of The Industrial Commission for the State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff filed this Writ of Review seeking reversal of 
the order of the Commission and a ruling and determination by 
this Court that plaintiff shall be eligible to receive future 
benefits during such times as he may be unemployed and eligible 
to receive benefits; that plaintiff shall be declared not 
-2-
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ineligible to receive benefits for the period beginning 
February 12, 1978, for fifty-two weeks thereafter and that 
the decision assessing a liability for overpayment in the 
amount of $1,785.00 be reversed and otherwise set aside. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was employed as a general laborer during all 
times material to this appeal and worked at various types 
of jobs. The plaintiff had worked the required amount of 
time, and on January 22, 1978, was determined eligible by 
The Department of Employment Security to receive $119.00 a 
week for 30 weeks. The plaintiff started to receive benefits 
from the Department in January, 1978. 
On February 12th, the plaintiff started working for 
Rhead Realty Construction on a trial basis for which it was 
his understanding he would not be paid. The plaintiff 
associates payment with working; and, therefore, reported on 
his claim for unemployment compensation that he was not 
employed. The plaintiff filed his last claim on February 28, 
1978, and in fact received his first check from Rhead Realty 
Construction on February 24, 1978. 
Plaintiff was paid for working at Rhead Realty Construc-
tion from February 24, 1978, until the last part of June, 1978. 
-3-
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Plaintiff was on the payroll at Rhead Realty Construction 
during July, 1978, but in fact, received no compensation durinq 
July, and was laid off on August 11th, 1978, because there was 
no work available. During July, 1978, the plaintiff reinstated 
his claim for unemployment benefits and drew benefits until 
September, 1978, at which time plai_ntiff resumed employment 
in the construction trades. While plaintiff was receiving 
unemployment benefits in August, 1978, Rhead Realty Construc-
tion again sent him a check that was late and which he was 
not expecting to receive. This check was sent out August 12, 
1978. This check, mailed August 1/., 1978, creates a second 
period of time from which the fiftv-two week period could 
have been calculated, had The Employment Security Division 
had the best interests and equity of justice in mind. 
On November 1st, 1978, plaintiff was mailed a notice 
asking him to explain the checks received bv him in February, 
1978. Plaintiff was given a telephone hearing on November 14, 
1978, in order to determine whether he had violated provision 
of Section 35-4-5(e) and 35-4-6(d) U.C.A., 1953. As a con-
sequence, plaintiff was disqualified from receiving benefits 
for the fifty-two week period beginning February 12, 1978. 
~ consequence of this disqualification was that the benefits paid 
-4-
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to plaintiff during various periods of unemployment after that 
date, were considered "overpayments" received by plaintiff's 
"fraud" and plaintiff was held to be liable for the immediate 
repayment of those amounts. 
During this telephone hearing, plaintiff maintained he 
was not intending to commit a fraud on the Department, but 
due to his misunderstanding of the rules he had made a mistake. 
On December 19, 1978, this case was heard in person by 
an Appeals Referee, and plaintiff testified concerning the 
dates of employment and his intentions. Plaintiff maintained 
he had merely misunderstood the rules and in no case did he 
intend to commit a fraud or withhold material information to 
receive benefits. Plaintiff maintained throughout this hear-
ing that his intentions were to receive benefits that he con-
sidered he was justly deserving. Also, during this hearing, 
the plaintiff explained the receipt of these benefits so as 
to show no more than three checks that were received in such 
a way as to be considered not deserved, and these were not 
received with any intention to commit fraud. The Appeals 
Referee found that the plaintiff "knowingly withheld the 
material facts of his work and earnings to receive benefits 
to which he was not entitled and the provisions of Section 
-5-
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35-4-5 (e) of the act apoly," however, the Aopeals Referee 
makes no mention of 35-4-6 (d) and how it should be apolied. 
The Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Apoeals Referee 
to the Board of Review and the prior decisions were affirmed. 
POINT I 
THE DECISION BY THE REVIEW BOARD IN THE PRESENT CASE IS 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE IN THAT THE REVIEW 
BOARD HAD ALTERNATE METHODS OF APPLICATION AVAILABLE. 
The plaintiff would like to draw the Court's attention to 
certain Review Board decisions that would suoport the arqument 
that the present Utah Emolovment Security Act also known 
as Utah Code Annotated Chapter 35-4 (hereafter referred to 
as Utah Code Annotated 35-4) has been interpreted in an 
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner. It has 
been the Court's decision in the past that this chapter, 
especially Utah Code Annotated 35-4-5 (e) is clear and 
unambitious and not open to interpretation. The Court has 
held that neither the Commission nor this Court can change a 
statute that is clear and unambiguous as is the one cited above. 
In fact, this Court has already oassed upon this point by a 
unanimous decision wherein it said: 
(1) 
"Plaintiff also complains that the deorivation of 52 weeks 
of benefits is a severe penalty. With this we are inclined 
to agree. However, under the statute it does not appear 
that the fact finder or this Court has the discretion 
to reduce or forgive any part of the penaltv." (l) 
Diprizio vs Industrial Commission of Board of Review 572, r 
679-681. 
-6-
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In 1965 The Board of Review heard a case ~6S-BR-395, 
Don Waterson vs Department of Employment Security (See 
Exhibit "A"). 
In that case, the Board of Review held that the Depart-
ments' Hearings Representative was without authority to 
increase the initial overpayment assessed attendant to a 
determination under Section 35-4-5 (el, even though such 
additional overpayment would have fallen wit~in the 52 
weeks disqualification period. This shows that not all monies 
received during such 52 week disqualification period are 
required to be repaid in all cases. In this particular case, 
the statute was open to interpretation. 
To further illustrate this point, Board of Review case 
number 75-BR-90, dated February, 1976, PABLO M. PAUL (see 
Exhibit "B" attached) the Board held that benefits received 
during the 52 week disqualification period could be offset 
by future claims filed after such period. This represented 
an interpretation of statute which this Court had maintained 
in Decker vs Industrial Commission, Utah, 533, P 2d 898 (197S). 
" ... it does not appear that the fact finder or this 
Court has the discretion to reduce or forgive any 
part of the penalty .. " 
In which case, the Court did not allow for any interore-
-7-
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tation of the aforementioned statute. 
It must be concluded bv the above argument that the 
statute is not clear and ambiguous and is in fact, open for 
interpretation especially if that interpretation is to be made 
by the Industrial Commission. It appears that the Industrial 
Commission does interpret this statute when such interpretation 
is to the benefit of the Commission. However, the plaintiff 
feels that interpretations should work both ways and where doubt 
exists, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the claimant. 
As Justice Crockett so ably brings forward in his dissent in 
DIPRIZIO (P 682), 
The commission should have the power to modifv or 
suspend the imposition of such penalities, or the time 
and manner of reimbursement required, on the purposes 
of the Act and the interests of Justice may require." 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE REVIEW BOARD TO DENY BENEFITS TO 
PLAINTIFF AND TO REQUIRE REPAYMENT OF A~OUNTS RECEIVED, 
WAS NOT BASED UPON ENOUGH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN 
THE DETERMINATION. 
The decision of the Industrial Commission is based primarilv 
upon 35-4-5 (e) Utah Codes Annotated 1953, Stating: 
"5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(e) For the week with resnect to which he had willfullv 
made a false statement or representation or knowingly 
failed to report a material fact to obtain any benefit 
under the provisions of this Act, 
-8-
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It is clear that this statute is primarily concerned 
with two words, "willfully" and "knowingly" and without those 
two words, the statute has no meaning. The plaintiff contends 
that for the Commission to show substantial evidence to sustain 
its determination it must prove the allegations found in 
"willfully" and "knowingly". This Court has held that to 
prove a case of fraud, the evidense must be clear and convincing. 
Perry vs McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P 2d 852, (1953). 
Further, this Court has held that when one is charged with a 
falsehood or misrepresentation, in order for it to be actionable 
or to deprive him of a right, it must be done willfully and 
knowingly. Mark vs Continental Casualty Company, 19 Utah 
2d 119, 427 p 2d 387 (1967). Utah criminal law under U.C.A. 
76-2-103, deals with criminal culpability and defines "willfully" 
and "knowingly." 
76-2-103 "A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with resDect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or 
the existing circumstances, to a result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is rea-
sonably certain to cause the result." 
-9 
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The plaintiff contends there is no evidence to show that 
it was his "conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result" that resulted in his being found in violation 
of 35-4-5 (e) Utah Code Annotated. Plaintiff never intentionally 
or willfully perpetrated a fraud on the Industrial Commission. 
The plaintiff further contends that he was never "aware that 
his conduct is (was) reasonably certain to cause the result", that 
is a fraud on the Industrial Commission. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THE REVIEW BOARD TO DENY BENEFITS TO PLAINTic' 
AND TO REQUIRE REPAYMENT OF AMOUNTS RECEIVED WAS IN ERROR 
IN THAT IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL THE APPLICATIONS OF 
35-4-6 (d) and (e) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
The code specifically denotes three types of overpayment 
and sets forth how and if such overpayments are to be recouped 
by the Department for the Unemployment Compensation Fund. 
1. Section 35-4-6 (d) indicates one type of overpayment. 
These are benefits received by reason of fraud and the code ' 
specifies that such benefits must be repaid. 
2. Section 35-4-6 (d) further states that another type of 
overpayment occurs through claimant fault and specifies that 
such benefits must either be repaid or offset by future 
claims at the discretion of the Commission. 
3. Section 35-4-6 (e) specifies that sums in the receipt 
of which the claimant is not at fault, are sums which the 
claimant is not liable to repay, but are to be recouped by 
offset from claims filed in the benefit year current at the 
time of receipt. 
-10-
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These three types of overpayment are best defined as 
follows: 
1. Benefits received by reason of fraud are sums 
received with respect to which all of the elements of 
fraud are present, including material infraction. 
Those benefits to which no material infraction attaches, 
cannot be said to have been received by reason of fraud. 
2. Benefits received by claimant fault are sums received 
to which a material infraction attaches, but with resoect 
to which not all of the other elements of fraud are -
present. Such sums are to be reoaid by the claimant 
or off set by future claims filed at the discretion of 
the Commission. 
3. Benefits received with respect to which no material 
infraction attaches are benefits received neither by 
fraud nor fault. Such benefits are recouped by offset 
of future claims filed only within the benefit year 
current at the time of the receipt of the sum of the 
overpayment. 
In summary, the statute demands that all sums received 
by reason of fraud be repaid and that all sums received ~y 
reason of claimant fault be repaid or offset by future claims 
filed, and that sums received neither by fraud nor fault be 
offset only in the benefit year current when such benefits 
were received. 
It is clear that the statute meant to level a severe 
penalty against the perpetrator of fraud and that claimants 
obtaining benefits by fraud or fault must restore such sums 
to the fund. It is also clear that sums received to which 
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n8ither fraud nor fault attaches, are not to be repaid, but 
are to be offset within the time limited by statute. 
Section 35-4-5 (e), is a section of the act which is 
not operable alone. It is a disqualifyinq section which is 
dependent upon the material infraction of some other section 
of the act, i e: 35-4-5 (a) Voluntarily Leavinq Work; 35-4-22 
(m) (1) which states the claimant must be unemployed or working 
less than full time and earning less that his weekly benefit 
amount; 35-4-3 (c) which defines in part, what is material 
in terms of the earnings of the Part-Total claimant. One of 
the above mentioned sections or another section of the Act, 
must supply materiality for the fraud statute to be aoolied. 
After the fraud statute is applied, then three areas 
must be examined: 
1. It must be determined what benefits were received 
by reason of the fraud, 
2. What benefits, if any, were received by claimant 
fault and 
3. What benefits were received without fault. 
The Referree and the Board of Review erred in the instant 
case by failing to cite that part of the statute which supplied 
the material infraction. It appears their conclusion was that 
the plaintiff was not unemployed as required for eligibility 
under Section 35-4-22 (m) (1) for the weeks at issue. Neither 
of their determinations cite material infraction. Only the 
-12-
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Notice of Hearing sent by the Referee bothered to refer to any 
overnayment section and neither decision has denoted an over-
payment section nor made explanation of any kind. 
It appears the Referee and the Board of Review have 
relied on Section 35-4-5 (e) to be both a disqualifying section 
and an overpayment section, and this it clearly is not. 
POINT IV 
THE DECISIONS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT IN THE PAST, HAVE CONSIDERED UTAY CODE ANNOTATED 
35-4-5 (e) WITHOUT ENFORCING THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE 
AND/OR THE EQUITIES INVOLVED. THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY HAVE FAILED IN THE PAST TO 
USE ALTERNATE METHODS OF COLLECTION THAT WOULD BE ~ORE 
EQUITABLE AND IN LINE WITH THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. 
Prior to July l, 1949, the penalty for fraud under the 
act (Employment Security Act, Chapter 42-2a-5 (e), as amended 
in 1947), was 2 to 10 weeks, which conformed with the most 
stringent penalty for material infraction and was reserved 
for the claimant who was discharged for misconduct connected 
with work. (Utah Code Annotated 42-2a-5 (e), as amended in 
1949) . 
Thus, a claimant who had been discharged for dishonesty 
cJnstituting a crime, but who frauduently initiated a claim 
and drew benefits throughout the benefit year, was held to 
hove perpetrated a material infraction wit~ resoect to the 
entire period. Accordingly, since a material infraction 
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3ttached to every week of such benefits received by the 
perpetrator, the overpayment would include all the benefits 
received during the disqualification ceriod. 
For the sake of definition, fraud against the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Fund may be said to be of two types: 
1. Type 1 is Simple Fraud which is made with rescect 
to a single week and involves a material infraction. 
Simple Fraud affects only a single week (35-4-4 as defined 
in 35-4-22 (m) (1) or only part of the benefits due 
for a given week (35-4-3 (c); 
2. Type 2 is Compound fraud. Compound Fraud, like 
Simple Fraud, requires only one false statement or repre-
sentation. This statement or misrepresentation results 
in the payment of benefits for more than just one week. 
Example: Leaving work voluntarily without good cause 
(possible 6 weeks) or being discharged for dishonesty, 
constituting a crime, (possible 52 weeks). 
Attention is called to that part of the statute which 
states that the claimant who has perpetrated a fraud is disqual-
ified '' .•. until he has repaid to the fund all monies he received I 
by reason of his fraud andwhich he received during such following 
51 week disqualification period ... " The part which reads 
" ... and which he received during such following 51 week dis-
qualification period ... " must relate to the definition of 
Compound Fraud. 
If this is not so, then the claimant who obtains $1.00 
hy reason of material infraction of Section 35-4-3 (c), is 
penalized the same way a claimant whose material infraction 
was under Section 35-4-5 (b) (2). Example, a claimant who 
-14-
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conceals $13.00 in earnings on his claim form once and only 
once, has fraudulently obtained $1.00 by Simple Fraud 
penalty as the claimant who conceals the fact that he was 
discharged for dishonesty constituting a crime when he initiated 
his claim. The second claimant has committed a material infrac-
tion under 35-4-5 (b) (2). 
If each claimant had a gross payable of $4,284.00 and 
each false statement was made with respect to the first com-
pensable week each would be disqualified for 52 weeks and each 
required to repay $4,284.00 to the fund. 
In our example, the claimant who obtained benefits by 
means of his compound fraud obtained the entire $4,284.00 by 
such means and in contrast the claimant who ~nowingly failed 
to report $13.00 in earnings on his first compensable week 
obtained $1.00 by reason of his fraud (the first $12.00 
excluded by statute from being material), but both required to 
repay $4,284.00 just as though they had committed the same 
act. 
A further example, claimants A and B who have weekly 
benefit amounts of $1.00 each and who each perpetrate simple 
fraud with respect to the first compensable week. Claimant A 
perpetrates no further material infractions for the next 35 
weeks, but continues to draw unemployment compensation. 
Claimant B perpetrates a fraud with respect to each of the 
-15-
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following 35 weeks. Both claimant A and B are required to 
repay the entire 36 weeks of benefits received ($3,GOO.OO). 
Plaintiff could cite endless examples of the possible 
inequities under the misapplication of the fraud and overpavment 
sections, of which we are sure the Court is aware. 
The determination in the instant case should have shown 
that the conclusion of the Referee and of the Board of Review 
was that the plaintiff was in material violation under Section 
35-4-4 as defined in 35-4-22 (m) (1) for each of the weeks as 
he was not "unemployed" during the time he received benefits. 
Their conclusion of fraud should reflect the application of 
Section 35-4-5 (e) for each of those weeks and for the 51-week 
period immediately following. 
The overpayment should be written in the following way: 
The claimant received a total of $1,785.00 during the disqual-
ification period to which it has been determined he was not 
entitled. $238.00 was received by reason of his fraud and that 
amount in overpayment is assessed under the fraud provision of 
Section 35-4-6 (d) and must be repaid. $1,547.00 was received 
to which no material infraction attaches and with respect to 
the receipt of which the claimant was not at fault. That amount 
will be deducted from future claims filed within the benefit 
16-
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y2ar current at the time of such receipt. 
POINT V 
1953, AS AMENDED, IS APPLIED AS DEFENDANT PROPOSES, PLAINTIFFS 
ARE DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS 
OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES. 
Defendant's application of U.C.A. 35-4-5 (e}, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, creates two classes of persons subject 
to a penalty period: 
1. Those individuals who were otherwise eligible and received 
unemployment compensation during the retroactively imposed 
penalty period and 
2. Those individuals who received no unemployment compen-
sation during the penalty period. The first class, which 
includes Plaintiffs, is subject not only to the penalty 
period but also to assessment of an overpayment that must 
be repaid before future benefits can be paid. The second 
class, in fact, incurs no penalty at all because those indivi-
duals are simply told that they were not eligible to receive 
benefits during a past period when there were presumably 
already ineligible or they would have been receiving bene-
fits. Both classes of individuals have committed the 
same violation of the Employment Security Act and deserve 
the same penalty. No rational basis exists for the present 
discriminatory treatment which bases the severity of the 
penalty purely on chance. 
The test of equal protection is whether the legislative 
line is drawn bears some rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental purpose. Dandridge vs Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1971). 
In the context of the Employment Security Act, the objective is 
to penalize persons who violate the Act and deter such violations. 
Since the severity of the penalty now depends on whether the indivi-
-17-
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dual happened to have received additional unemployment com-
pensation during the disqualification period, it bears no 
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
Therefore, it conflicts with the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 2, and of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons cited above, plaintiffs request the Court 
to reverse defendant's findings that plaintiff knowingly with-
held material facts of work and earnings, reverse defendant's 
assessment of 52 week disqualification periods, and reverse 
defendant's assessment of overpayments. 
For the reasons cited above, plaintiff requests that the 
Court reverse the findings of the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission. Plaintiff further requests that the 
Court find that the Department of Employment Security and its 
Board of Review have improperly construed and misapplied 35-4-5 
(c), 35-4-6 (d), and 35-4-6 (e) and these statutes have not 
been properly applied and requests that the Court overturn 
the decision of the Board of Review. 
Plaintiff shows that the intent of the legislature and 
the rules of equity could be better applied and that there are 
alternate methods of collection that could be used by the Depart-
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ment of Employment Security. The plaintiff requests that the 
Court overturn the decision of the Board of Review and instruct 
the Department of Employment Security to use the alternate 
methods available by statute. 
Plaintiff further requests that the Court find that the 
application of U.C.A. 35-4-5 (e), in the instant case, violates 
petitioners rights under the Constitutions of the United States 
and the State of Utah. 
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l. 
'Io. Ibdustrtal Cooirluton of Utah 
\!Da:IJl lO)'QQD t C ocpcn.u. t ion I.~· le 
DZCISIO?I 07 APPEAJ..1 ~ 
Don t.Utter11oa 
1.S.A. r;o. 529 26 9200 
,,.. 
I .,, , 
6S-A·ll 
OD April 12, 1955, the clall:w>"'t'a attorney filed • lettor whlch ws construed l.J 
ap;:>o.41 frOlll a detanaln.:ition o,; a Dc,.ar~~ Bel.aria.~ Ile;>rc:aentative d.!!te4 Fe!iru:1 
19~S, vhicb ddulcd UDBT>loycant benefit• for tho 52-vo.ek pariod l:;csinnin(l wi~h 1 
week elhlod <>:to~r 24, l'i•:>4, f'nd until t~ clai.Qant .:-e~1• t!lo l'!l:lOUnt of $/16•J.va 
!or benefit• rec~t~ c!uri~ tn. d•squ.illfica.Uon period. 'ihe dot..etoic.:ition WI.I 
c.l4!e •>U th• s.;round11 th:lt lolll(lll- flll~ • cu.la ofiactive 0.:to~er 19. l'..i~. the cla 
a.nt 1mo ... 1~ly :1lthbald tile niiterial fact that on &cpcGcl>er 25, 19&4, he had bceu 
diocb.:ltged fra:z bia ea,lu,f:MllU.t. 
tho &i?peal· waa received by the J.;>pealt Section on ~prU 19, 1965. · 
B..ued on tile record perUnllilt to cilia cat~r, tha Appeals Jl.c!crea ~ tho foll· 
1. Tb.at on October 21 0 19~, t!le cllli=lt file<! &n s-Odltion.ll cla•.a for uncenlo: 
s:icnt baneiita eti&etive Oc::c>Ocr 1? 0 l'.lf>4 0 vith GubSCCjUdllt ~c;s.ly cln~ th-crea!~ 
until 010 acount o! $4'J~J.fr:J .,aa recei'll'l."<i ln benefit. pa)'C:l."lta. 1:1-w::eaftP.r it .,M 
clct~rulned 0 art.er a roco:dBd h<'.sritw, 1 that uh<!!l f!.llc,;; t.li:J aGdl.tion.al elala cfiM 
ttvo Octcb<lr 19, 19~. t.hG cl.:1~t ':lit!1hsld ti-.e ~tadal £~t tb3t he h:.d1 <>A 
Se;>teDler 2.5, 1904, bcc:i d!sc!lar~ed fro.ta e=ploymcnt. 
2. 111.at llUCb detoratnat!oo vu 1s5Ut\d ca lobru.uy 23, l!H~ • ..od coaaist011t \lltb 
the requlr~ata of Section 35-4-5(e) and Section 35-4-G(c) of the Utah ~lo;~~ 
Socurity Act cont-ainied t.hv notice, '-'Any a?pe..al fr.oil\ thla dedaion aat be ~e 
vithiD ten day• aftar tho date of tht. dec!sioa • ., 
llo •;>peal fr::a the cl.2.1=-t •!>?'J.ara o! reco.rd Ulltll the letter of A'.>ril 12, 1~61, 
fr:c:c tba claiz:ua.t'• &tl:Oct!f!Ye 'Icd s. Porry 0 of L?:;.:i.a, Utah. The De~rtr:=lt, by 
letter of April 2u, 1Jo5, rojoctod a requu.t for r~tetuin:ition ;>UZBuant to 
Scctioa 35-4-~(l>) of the Act. 
Section 35-4-S(o) of the Uc.ah ~loyc:ient ~rity Act pr.:nride.a: 
5. An i!ldhic!.u&l alull be inelli;ible !or benefits OX' for 
purpos•a of e.t~liahi1:1& a vaitiIJG pcriod1 
(c) ••• ;ind pro.,,idcd furth-cr thAt ouch daten:.iD.:ttiOQ 
sh.all be ::,;>0.:1lji!Jlu in t.'!c o::.i::; .. "li!r p:-o·.n.~ by thia ccc for 
&ppe41• f:-o;a other benefit \latcrc.ln.st.iona. 
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Sec:t1oa 35-W(c) o! the Uuh ~loyucmt Security Act proo.'idess 
(c) The Cl~t.cant or L'fr1 otl-.ar ~rty entitled to EZt>tiee Of & 
doten:lination u hereto ?rovided my fllo i:ia n;>?Csl £roca GUCb 
do~cn:il~tion with au e?po:l r~fereo vit.;1n tea ~~Y• efter the 
dat• of e.aill11;; of th• cot1c• to h11 l~s~·knoo.'11 llddrea. or, 1! 
such notica ta not n1Ued, lrlth!J:a t.:o d.:ya after tb6 data ot 
d4lh-.ry of INCh oot1ca. 
ca;:LVSI03 01 Ulh 
That th& clei!!l.\nt did not file a ttciely aµ~ei.1 frtia tho da~en:i!nAtloa of tha De• 
p£r~t'e H~arfne ~~aitat1ve 2nd the A~3la R.afcroe, therefore. laclta 
j\.'T1adict1on for further coll.ll;deratloo of t:::io mtter. 
J~riodic:tlon l• dcllied. 
Dt~ t~11 22nd day of April. 1965. 
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BOARD 01 REVIEY 
Th.e Industrial COCl!llisslon of Utah 
Department of Employcent Security 
Dal WA'M'E)'s<Xf' i 
SS# 52 9 .46 9200 ' 
l>ECISIO!f 
,, .. 
•· Case Bo. 65-BR-395 
DEPillH!NT or DIPLCJYHD(T SECUUTY 
The appeal lo the above-entitled matter la before 
this Board on the issue of vhether or not the Appeal Referee 
vaa correct lo his f lndings that the deciaion of the Hearing 
Representative disqualifying the claimant, Watterson, had . 
beco:ne final prior to the filing of any appeal therefrom as 
provided by the statute. The decision of the Hearing Repre-
sentative became final on March 5, 1965, which date was ten 
dsya after the calling of the decision on February 23, 1965, 
No appeal waa filed frO!ll this decision until April 12, 1965, 
far beyond the ten•dsy statutory period. 
An exa:m.Lnation-of_tb~~or~owa that the Bearing 
l.epresentatlve ~March 8, 196~ttempt o aoend the deci• 
aion of February 23, 1965, by increasing the crpoyracnt frO!ll 
$60.00 to $460.00. Inas!lllJch 8$ the February 2 declsion_had 
becooe final on Marc , the Rearing Represents ve no lonzer 
had _any_author~ty_to_i;h11nge_t_l!e lnrtrn-oe<;: __ ~--· 'l'he overpay-. 
ment of $60.00 established by the February 23, 1965, decision ' 
la the acount which the claimant must repay to the Unemployment 
Compensation Fund. 
You are advised that thia decision vill becocie fin.al 
ten days after the date of malling hereof, and that any appeal 
to the Supre!:18 Court of the State of Utah must be made within 
ten days after this decision beca::ies final. 
IOAll.D 01 . RXVIEll 
/S/ Otto A. Wlesley 
Eliot T. Gates 
Dimiel A. Elton 
Dated tbla 20th day of Hay, 1965. 
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The I1H.lustrial Co=1i:;slon of Utah 
U11t·J.1ployL:cn t Cu:1pcnsat ion Appc.il:; 
APPEALS SECTI0:-1 
DECISIO'.i or APPEALS REFEREE 
vs. 
Depart-cent of El::iployl!:ent Security 
340.25 
75-A-1320 
On Hay 5, 1975, the claimant, , thr.ough his attorney, Hr. Michael 
Shepherd, filed a ti~ely appeal froa a decision of a Departcent Representative 
·dated April 28, 1975, which denied benefits under Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah 
D:iploy:w.ent Security Act for the 52-week period beginning January 5, 1974, and 
until he had repaid to the Utah Unecployaent Coapensation Fund the a::::ount of 
$1,392.00, on the grounds the claiEant had knowingly '!;'ithheld i:;:;aterial facts 
•ith respect to his ~«ploy!'.!ent and earnings free }1. H. Cook Pipeline Construc-
tion Co~pany when filing clai~s for unecplo)'l:!ent cccpensation for the calendar 
weeks ended Januazy 5, 1974, and February 16, 1974. 
The natter was received by the Appeals Section on May 14, 1975, and on June 15, 
1975, notices of the tice and place of hearing ;;ere directed to the parties. 
The hearing was held in the office of the Appeals Referee, 1234 South Hain, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on June 23, 1975, at the hour of 1:30 p.c. Present at the 
hi:arir.g was Mr. Hichael Shephe.rd, Attorney at LaY. Tne clai.I::a.nt w-as not prese:nt. 
The appeal filed on May 5, 1975, had been based on three issues: (1) there was 
· inadec;uate evidence that Hr. Paul ~.-orked duriq; the tit:!e period specified; 
(2) tr.ere was no evidence to support the finding of fraud; and (3) if a 
fr.::udulent overpa)'L!er..t is established, should be allo-:•ed to use current 
valid claims for uneaployr:ent co~pensation as offsets against the overpayaent 
established. 
It was specified by ~r. Shepherd that subsequent to filing of the appeal it had 
been deternined that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings that 
the claill!ant was in violation of provisions of Section 35-4-5(e) of the Act and 
,the first two issues enul:!erated in the appeal were being withdrawn. The only 
[issue being pursued 1.1as the issue· of the overpayment and the DepartI!lent 's holding 
that the overpayment must be repaid to the Utah Une~ploy1'1ent Coopensaticn Fund 
before the cla:Ll!lant could again be eligible to receive benefits and that the 
lovcrpaynent will not be offset by claims filed by the clai~ant subsequent to the 
period of disqualification. 
Sections 35-4-S(e) and 35-~-6(d) of the Utah E::iployment Security Act provide as 
cho·.11 on the attachment. . .. 
In ,1ccnrc!nncc with the lanr,u:!ce of Section 35-4-5(c), the claim:int 1:1 di::.qu.:ili-
ffru for th0 vcck fn \1hich the violation haG occurred ;m<l for the 51 additional 
1.·cck~ .'.:.:'~until he has rcp:1 l<l to the fun<l all r.:onlcs he n·ceivcd by reason o! 
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75-A-IJ:o 
his fr:iu<l nnd 1,;hich he received durinr, Lhe subsequent 51-1o.•eck disqu.:ilification 
p::::-J0<l. It would :ippear th;it the lan;:.ua;;e, "<:?ncl until he h::is ·i:ep;ii<l to the 
Fun<l," w;is added to the l"nployr.~nt Sccuri ty Act to provj dl! a r.ieans of cor.1pcll1 
clai~~nts who had com~itte<l fraud to actually ~::ike a refund as a condition of 
continuing eligibility. Section 35-4-6(d) of the Act makes similar provisio:i:;, 
e:nd there are no provisions of off scttinr, p:iymcnts of bcnef its received as a 
result o[ violation of Section 35-4-S(e) of the Act. 
The appellant argues that such interpretation of the l:J.o:.r prohibiting offsets is 
uncoastitutional. However, the natter of constitutionality of the law should 
cot be deteroined here. 
CONCLUSION PJID DECISIO~: 
That the claimant when filing claims for unCl:!plo~ent corapensation for the 
cale~dar weeks ended January 5, 1974, and February 16, 1974, did knowingly 
~ithhold naterial infon:iation with respect to employment and earnings for the 
purpose of receiving unei::ployment cocpensation to which he was not entitled, 
and therefore was in violation of Section 35-4-S(e) of the Act. The decision 
of the Departcen: Represe~tative is affirced and benefits are denied for the 
52-week period cc~encing with the calen~ar ,,;eek ended January 5, 1974, and 
until he has rep~id to the Utah Une~ploynent Coopensation Fund the acount of 
$1,392.00. 
Dated this 9th day of July, 1975. 
plb 
A. U. Pardini 
Appeals Referee 
UTAH DEPARnn-r OF Et1PLO'i'}IBNT SECURITY 
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BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Co;nmisslon of Ut."lh 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
Case No. 75-A-1320 
DECISION 
Case No. 75-BR-90 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
340.25 
The Board of Review, after careful consideration of the record and 
testimony in the above-entitled matter, hereby affirms the decision of the 
Appeals Referee which denied unemployment benefits under Section 35-4-5(e) of 
the Employment Security Act for the 52-week period of December 30, 1973 to 
Dececber 28, 1974, and thereafter until the claimant repays $1,392 which he 
received in unemployment benefits during that disqualification year. Such 
decision was based upon the determination, conceded by the claimant through 
Counsel, that in filing a claim for unemployment benefits for the week ended 
January 5, 1974, the claimant did knowingly withhold the material facts that 
he ~orked and had earnings in the amount of $83.55 during such week and that 
by reason of his fraud he was paid $1,392 in ~eekly benefits to which he was 
not entitled. 
Counsel for the claimant contends, however, that the language of 
Sections 35-4-4, 35-4-5 and 5(e), and 35-4-6(d) permit an interpretation of 
the Employment Security Act by which the claimant could be found eligible for 
benefits upon his subsequent new claim filed January 5, 1975, and thereupon 
file eligible weekly claims to offset against the overpayment until the payment 
is satisfied. Further, Counsel contends that failure of the Referee to make 
such interpretation amounts to an unconstitutional denial of the claimant's 
rights of Equal Protection. 
The Board is unable to concur in either contention but holds, as 
appears necessary, that: 
(1) The language of the above-aited sections, particularly 
35-4-4 and 35-4-5, does not permit the subsequent 
attainment of eligibility for benefits during a con-
tinuing ~cciod of disqualification, co~sequently, there 
are no new benefits to offset against the overpayment; · 
and 
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vs. 
BOARD OF ilf.VIEW 
The Industrial C~mmis~ion of Utah 
Un~~ploy~cnt Cor:!pensation Appeals 
Case No. 75-A-1~2~ 
DECISIC!:l' 
Case No. 75-HR-90 
DEPARTMENI OF EMPLOY?-!ENT SECURITY. 
Page 2 
(2) The requirements of Equal P=otection do not preclude 
the legislative imposition, upon proper grounds, of a 
benefit disqualification continuing until monies 
~rrongly received have been repaid to the Unemplo~nt 
Insurance Fund. 
340. 25 
This decision will become final ten days ~fter the date of mailin~ 
hereof, and any appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah must be made 
within ten days after this decision becomes final. 
Dated this ~ day of ~~O_c_t_o_b_e_r~-'--""-
Date Nailed: November 4, 1975. 
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BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
340.25 
Case No. 75-A-1320 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
DECISION 
Case No. 75-BR-90 
AMENDED 
Due to the serious nature and consequence·s of the problem presented 
in this case, the Board of Review has reconsidered the matter and the decision 
issued on October 29, 1975. 
After careful review of the wording of Section 35-4-5(e) of the 
Employment Security Act, it is concluded there is an ambiguity concerning 
the duration of the disqualification and the requirements of the repayment 
of the monies received as a result of the fraud. Because of the ambiguity, 
this part of the section of the law is subject to interpretation. 
It is concluded at this point that the disqualification for 
fraudulently obtaining benefits is interpreted to be no longer than the 
52 weeks. It is further interpreted that after the 52-week disqualification 
period a claimant who is otherwise eligible for benefits may file for such 
benefits but may not receive them until all the monies he received by reason 
of his fraud have been repaid, either by cash payment or offset of subsequent 
val id claims, However, this should not deter any reasonable collect ion 
actions by the Department for monies owed subsequent to a fraud hearing 
and decision. 
It should be noted that if such interpretation-should result in a 
material increase in fraud among those claimants offsetting their overpayment 
s·o as to lessen effectiveness of this section then some other reasonable 
interpretation of this section should be considered. 
The application of this interpretation results in an amendment of 
the decision issued by the Board on October 29, 1975. In this case, it was 
conceded by the claimant, through his counsel, that when filing his claim for 
unemployment benefits for the week ended January 5, 1974, the claimant did 
knowingly withhold the material facts that he worked and had earnings in the 
amount of $83.55 during such week and that by reason of his fraud he was paid 
$1,392.00 in weekly benefits to which he was not entitled, 
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IlOAIUJ OF ICEVICW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compcnsat ion J\ppc::i ls 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Page 2 
Case No. 75-A-1320 
DECISION 
Case No. 75-BR-90 
AMENDED 
It is, therefore, the decision of the Board that the $1,392.00 
is immediately due and owing; but as the claimant is U!lemployed and 
otherwise eligible for benefits, he can use subsequent valid claios to 
offset the overpayment. 
This decision will become final ten days after the date of 
mailing hereof, and any appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah must be made within ten days after this decision becomes final. 
Dated th is _____!.!!h d ::iy of __ F_e_b_r_u_::i_r~y ___ _ 
Date Mailed: February 20, 1976 
340.25 
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SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE, 
PO I NT I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 5 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW HAYE 
PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE INTENT OF THE UTA~ STATE 
LEGISLATURE WITH RESPECT TO SEC~lQNS 35-4-~(E), b(n), 
AND b(E), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1~~5, AS AMENDED, 
PO I NT I I I I I I I ~r1- I 4 I r1- I I I I I I ' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 16r1-~ I I I I I I I I I I 10 
SECTION ))- '-)(E), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED ~)) 1 AS AMENDED, 
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PO I NT Iv I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I • I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 12 
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IS SUPPORTED BY SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE 
APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT 
PLAINTIFF KNOWINGLY WITHHELD MATERIAL INFORMATION 
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BENEFITS TO WHICH HE WAS NOT 
ENTITLED, 
COMCLUS I ON I I I I I I I ' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I • I I I I I 13 
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